Review of 2.1GHz Spectrum Auction in Various Countries
S. Malisuwan, N. Yaowakhan, N. Tiamnara, and N. Suriyakrai
National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission, Bangkok, Thailand
Abstract—The objective of this paper is to compare 2.1GHz spectrum auction in various countries with emphasis on spectrum packaging, auction format and reserve price. Spectrum packaging which is number of licenses and size of license has direct effects on market competition. For an optimum spectrum packaging an auction designer must consider both market competition, technical requirements and must ensure consistency with auction format. Popular formats for 2.1GHz spectrum auction are sealed-bid, ascending-bid and clock auctions. Furthermore, reserve price is a critical mechanism in controlling competition intensity within the auction, auction revenue and efficient allocation. In this paper, we provide a detailed comparison spectrum packaging, auction format, reserve price, auction procedures and mechanisms used in different countries, to bring clarity on different auction mechanisms that are used to tailor a different outcome.
Index Terms—spectrum, auction, license, reserve price
Cite: S. Malisuwan, N. Yaowakhan, N. Tiamnara, and N. Suriyakrai, "Review of 2.1GHz Spectrum Auction in Various Countries," Journal of Advanced Management Science, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 439-446, November 2016. doi: 10.18178/joams.4.6.439-446